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BODY: Social Theories

II. SOCIAL THEORIES
Everywhere one looks in medicine, one finds bodies.
Not only are bodies ubiquitous, they are essential to the
practice of medicine. Whenever something seems to go
awry with our bodies, we seek the services of medicine
and become "patients." Medical personnel often reduce
patients' bodies to the particular problems they present,
for example, "the coronary bypass in room 14B" or the
"end~stage renal disease case." Bodies are the material
upon or through which medicine is practiced: clinicians
touch, scan, listen to, cut into, comfort, rehabilitate,
alter, and monitor the bodies of patients. Likewise, prac#
titioners bring their bodies with them when they enter
the clinic. Clinicians not only interact with patients and
families through their bodies (e.g., shaking hands,
touching, probing, lifting, bathing patients), they also
bring to the clinical setting their own unique embodied
experience-gendered, professional, perhaps overtired,
young or old, ill or healthy, angry or compassionate,
prejudiced, and so on. Thus, the body is an indispensable component of those persons experiencing illness
and those giving care, as well as to the dynamics of ill..
ness and healing. Without a body, there is no person,
no identity, no relationship, no health, no illness, no
healing.
Yet despite the fact that bodies are so central to
medicine, "the body" is rarely mentioned in the litera ..
ture of bioethics. Discussions in bioethics generally cen..
ter on concepts of personhood (Is the patient a person?
Is the person competent?), issues related to personhood
(such as autonomy, informed consent, rights, confiden ..
tiality, choice), and questions of cost/benefit analysis
(Do the benefits outweigh the risks? How can we
achieve the greatest good for the greatest number at the
lowest cost?). A patient's "personhood" is generally
understood in terms of rationality or mental capacity
(rather than, for example, a beating heart, membership
in the species homo sapiens, or one's ability to form emo.tional bonds to others), personal values and preferences
(rather than, for example, obligations based on relationships or social roles), and ability to function autono ..
mously rather than, alternatively, one's ability to
recognize and to function within our essential interde.pendence and interrelatedness).
Moreover, because "personhood" has been so nar..
rowly defined, and because bioethics has made person.hood its central category, many of the significant
problems in bioethics center on bodies whose status
as "persons" is unclear, bodies that lack or have lost
rationality, for example: "defective" neonates, anence.phalic newboms 1 brain.-dead potential organ donors, pa ..
tients in persistent vegetative state, fetuses to be aborted
or experimented on, mentally handicapped and incar.cerated individuals to be used as research subjects, or

elderly individuals suffering from dementia or Alzheimer's disease. When these patients have not left ra ..
tional and autonomous specifications of what their
preferences would be (e.g., living wills, organ donor
cards), other individuals possessing rationality, prefer..
ence, and autonomy (either patient surrogates or the
courts) decide what to do with their bodies.
There is a growing consensus that this notion of per.sonhood is too narrow, and that by excluding attention
to the body, bioethics does not fully take into account
all the morally significant dimensions of the practice of
medicine. If we cannot be a self or act in the world without our body, then that body must be included inro the
description of the moral situation. At the same time,
there is a concern that, in spite of the rhetoric of free ..
dom, personal fulfillment, and rights, by overlooking
the body, medicine and bioethics can become (some
would say "have become") avenues through which so ..
ciety restricts the freedom of its members through repres.sion and control.

The body in medicine and bioethics:
Empiricist materialism
The fact that the body is overlooked is due in large part
to the ways in which the body is understood by medicine, bioethics, and contemporary Western culture.
Richard Zaner has provided a helpful outline of the development of the view of the body that dominates contemporary medicine and is shared by bioethics (Zaner,
1994 ). This view is called "empiricist materialism" and
is chiefly the legacy of, among others, Francis Bacon
(1561-1626) and Rene Descartes (1596-1650). A third
philosopher who has also been influential in shaping
how bioethics approaches the body is John Locke
(1632-1704).
Francis Bacon is credited with the development of
the modern scientific experimental method. The devel ..
opment of this method required a new understanding of
the meaning of "nature." Bacon demythologized nature,
declaring it to be little more than brute, inert, morally
neutral, raw material, available to be dissected and ma ..
nipulated through empirical investigation in order to
gain knowledge of its universal laws and regularities.
Such knowledge is power, Bacon proposed, for in spite
of its status as totally object, nature was also understood
as containing within it great power, chaotic power that
threatened to undo the orderliness of civilization (take,
e.g., the destructive power of tornadoes, earthquakes,
and illness). As the human mind gamed knowledge of
nature, through rational empirical investigation and
quantification, this power could be channeled and con..
trolled, thus giving humanity power over nature and
making it fulfill human needs.
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One aspect of nature affected by this change in understanding was the human body. The body, understood
as inert, morally neutral raw material, became likewise
amenable to scientific investigation and control. This
reconceptualization of the body was accelerated by the
work of Descartes. Descartes asserted that the mind (or
soul) is both entirely distinct from and morally superior
to the body (Descartes, 1968). This view is called
"mind/body dualism" and exerted a strong influence on
the development of Western philosophy. Allied to this
mind/body dualism was Descartes's view of the body as
a machine (Descartes, 1968).
This Cartesian metaphor of the body as a machine,
in conjunction with Baconian empiricism, has been
greatly influential in medical research and contemporary
medicine. Medicine has made significant progress by un~
derstanding the body as being comprised of separable
and identifiable mechanisms. Because the body has been
understood as natural and universal, medical science has
been able to conduct empirical investigation of the
body, yielding statistical standards defining the "normal"
human body and methods by which medicine can manipulate and control bodies that diverge from those
norms. In fact, some have deemed the body most hu~
man" when it is most completely manipulated, con~
trolled, transformed, or created by human agency
(Fletcher, 1971). While medicine has adopted the legacies of empiricism and mechanism, it has been the
Cartesian view of mind/body dualism that has most
strongly influenced contemporary bioethics, allowing it
to focus almost exclusively on the 1'mind," "self," or
"person" when it defines and describes the issues and
moral parameters of medicine.
A third influence on contemporary bioethics with
respect to the body has been John Locke. In his Second
Trearise on Government, Locke sought a framework for
understanding political society. Locke posited that individuals initially exist in a "state of nature," that is,
individual and unconstrained, until they consent to join
an ordered society. While Locke's discussion of consent,
rights, duties, and so forth are too complex to summarize
here (see Copleston, 1964a), these concepts and particularly his notion of private property have notably influenced the worldview of contemporary bioethics. This LS
especially evident in the way bioethics has become in~
creasingly intertwined with the U.S. legal system and
involved in the formarion of public policy. While Locke
did not discuss the body as such, his views on private
property and ownership have been incorporated into the
subsequent labor theory of value and applied to contemporary understandings of the body. For Locke, in the
state of nature, insofar as an individual invests labor in
raw material to produce a product, that individual
receives ownership and utilization rights over that
product. Correlatively, insofar as the body is a natural
11
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resource, a raw material, and insofar as one's body and
the bodies of one's offspring are the products of one's
labor, the body in bioethics is often treated under the
paradigm of property rights (Campbell, 1992; Englehardt, 1985).

A contemporary critique: Social theories of
the body
If a pnmary purpose of bioethics is to reflect on the
moral and ethical dimensions of practices and to resolve
issues that arise in medicine and scientific research, one
must take into account all relevant factors. How one
perceives the issues and problems depends largely on
how one describes the situation.
Dissatisfaction with a bioethics that employs a philosophical framework rendering the body superfluous to
ethical and moral reflection has resulted in the recent
emergence of a number of alternative approaches that
seek fuller descriptions of the moral situation. These ap#
preaches employ philosophical frameworks that envision
relationships-between self and body, bet\veen persons
and their experiences, and between persons--differently
than the framework that draws on Descartes, Locke, and
other forebears of liberal political philosophy. These approaches (specifically phenomenology, feminism, an
ethics of care, virtue, narrative, and hermeneutics) are
critical of a medicine that treats merely "the body" and
not "the whole person." They are also critical of a
bioethics that reduces persons to their rationality and
choice, sevenng the connections between persons and
their bodies. (See for example, Zaner, 1988, and Leder,
1990, who take a phenomenological approach; and
Sherwm, 1992, who takes a feminist approach. For
fuller discussions of virtue ethics, narratLve ethics, phe#
nomenology, and hermeneutics, see DuBose et al.,
1994.)
An additional alternative framework for describing
"what is going on" in medicine and understanding the
function of bioethics is an analytical approach called
"social theories of the body." Social theories of the body
examine the interrelationships between social orders
and the bodies within their jurisdiction. To understand
their approach to the body, we must first discuss their
broader framework. Every society, they suggest, has an
"order," that is, integrated structures of power, institu~
tions, codes of behavior, practices, and beliefs. The "or#
der" of a society is also referred to as the "politics" of the
society, that is, the formal and informal relations of
power and control that govern a society.
One objective of every social order is to perpetuate
(or reproduce) itself. Social orders perpetuate themselves by incorporating new members who assume the
roles, espouse the beliefs, support the institutions, and
participate in the practices of the society. The primary
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way in which social orders incorporate new members is
through the social institutions and practices with which
they intersect, touch, or agree not to touch human bod~
ies. Socia[ practices comprise a broad range of activities
through which a culture regulates the private actions
and public interactions of its members: eating customs
(e.g., fasting or kashrut [kosher laws]), sexual practices
(e.g., monogamy or polygamy, prostitution, adultery,
homosexuality), economic structures (e.g., capitalism,
communism, barter), practices of dress (e.g., Amish
"plain and simple," clerical robes), judicial and penal
structures (e.g., public hangings, incarceration, excom#
munication)i religious practices (e.g., confession, pil~
grimage, ancestor worship), and so on. Clearly, such
practices vary significantly both among and within cul·
tures ("subcultures 11 are groups which adopt unconven ..
tional practices-practices that are often meant to
counter the dominant culture).
Through these practices, those bodies within the jurisdiction of a particular social order internalize the or..
der's beliefs and become constructed in conformity with
the order's structures. In every culture, certain practices
are considered the norm or the ideal, although deviations from the norm are generally tolerated as most cul
tures hold to beliefs that are often contradictory (for
example, a culture that idealizes monogamous marriage
may also sanction a thriving prosititution industry). By
participating in these practices, individuals learn and in.ternalize the beliefs and norms (as well as the contradic·
tions) of the culture. The more a practice impinges upon
one's body, especially the bodies of infanrs and children,
the more deeply the norms are internalized or "embod..
ied," the more unconsciously and effortlessly the 11 poli
tics" of the culture is learned. (For a display of the
dynamic between practices, bodies, and social orders,
see Douglas, 1966. )
The interaction between social institutions and hu
man bodies n1ay be potential (government), indirect
(media, advertisement), direct but intermittent (medi ..
cine, religion), or direct and constant (prisons, asy ..
lums). Through these institutions, cultures seek to
normalize, discipline, and regulate both the bodies of
individuals (in Michel Foucault's term, "anatomo.-poli.tics") and the bodies of its total population or subgroups
("biopolitics" or "biopower").
In addition, social theories of the body hold not
only that thtough practices individuals embody the beliefs of their cultures. At the same time, they suggest,
cultures require different "kinds" of bodies to maintain
their power structures or they find themselves faced with
different kinds of bodies that need to be located in the
social order, and they subsequently "construct'' them to
fit the needs of the social order. For example, the eco·
nomic and social order of anrebellum Georgia depended
upon the institution of slavery. To maintain this order,
1
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a set of practices designed to construct the bodies of
blacks as slaves was required to internalize the cultural
view that understood them as slaves. These practices in ..
eluded kidnapping and incarceration, physical punishment, rape, total economic dependence upon owners,
selling individual family members, marginalized and impoverished dwellings, and so on.
In addition, for whites to participate in these prac.tices in good conscience and for blacks to submit, the
practices required conceptual rationalizations that con ..
structed an understanding of blacks as inferior to whites.
For example, religious discourse construed blacks as in.ferior either due to their "heathen" status or due to their
descent from Ham, a less privileged son of Noah. Med·
ical discourse, drawing on Darwinian concepts, asserted
that blacks were not as advanced as whites on the evo·
lutionary spectrum, or drew normative conclusions from
real physiological differences. In short, the order of a
given culture requires this interdependence between
practices, discourses, and institutions. As will be dis.cussed below, this interdependence is also the location
for resistance and change.
While this is a graphic and coercive example of the
ways in which the bodies of particular individuals and a
particular group were constructed, social theories of the
body would maintain that all people's bodies are constructed. Feminist theory has been a major proponent of
this view (see Walker, 1991 ). But because people internalize and generally accept the norms of their culture,
they do not generally understand their bodies as con·
structed. Because of the objective reality of institutions,
the official status of discourses, and the embodied dimension of practices, they see the abilities, constraints,
limits, perceptions, and experiences of their bodies as
"natural," "given," "the way things are," "right," or
"true."
The primary analytical and ethical category for social theories of the body is power. Social theories of the
body understand bodies as the medium through which
social institutions derive power, authority, reality, and
meaning as the site upon which power and social control
are maintained. Bodies, as Elaine Scarry suggests, are
material and real, while political and social configurations are abstractions, precisely lacking material reality.
Through the ways in which they intersect human bodies, social orders appropriate the materiality of human
bodies and gain the appearance of reality (Scarry, 1985).
The most significant analyst of the relationships be·
tween power, knowledge, and the body, and therefore
the most central figure in the development of social theories of the body, has been Michel Foucault (1973,
1979, 1980).
While not denying that power can and often is exercised in ways that are negative, coercive, or repressive,
social theories of the body instead see power as a per..

BODY: Social Theories
vasive and necessary part of every social order. They focus on four other characteristics of power, specifically
that it is "productive," "local," "continuous," and "cap·
illary." Power is "productive" insofar as it is that quality
that enables individuals and groups to act (generally toward their own advantage} and to effect desired ends and
goals. Power is "local" because it is exercised at the level
of individual bodies through techniques and technologies of surveillance (quantification, examination, clas·
sification, statistical ranking) and discipline. Power
operates "continuously" because individuals, by willingly
participating in official practices of surveillance, classi·
fication, and self.discipline, become self·surveying, in.temalizing the normative intent of the practices. And
finally, power is "capillary" (drawing on the metaphor of
arterial and venous capillaries that are the smallest con·
duits of blood flow, feeding the furthest reaches of the
body); power operates through the most common and
least formal channels of the social body in everyday
practices, such as eating, medicine, and sexuality.
An essential element in establishing systems of
power are discourses, as illustrated above by the roles
medical and religious discourses played in the institution
of slavery. Discourses are verbal and literary constructs
through which systems of knowledge are established.
Discourses generally belong exclusively to a professional
group and are the means by which that profession defines and advances norms for human subjectivity, ac ..
tions, and bodies. Bioethics would be an example of
such a discourse. Bioethics belongs to the professional
group of philosophers, theologians, and clinicians who
have learned the language. Through this discourse,
bioethicists have defined the normative essence of hu ..
man personhood as rationality, and they have advanced
a system of ethical evaluation based on rational auton..
omous action, and so forth.
When discourses and practices become the exclu.sive domain of a select group of professionals, domina..
tion by that group is almost unavoidable, yet almost
imperceivable. Joanne Finkelstein (1990) describes how
technology, especially medical technology, is crucial to
this dynamic. Through discourse, practices, and tech..
nologies, professions cultivate consumer desires and offer
the means to satisfy those desires. Yet by exclusively possessing a desired commodity, those providing the service
(e.g., in vitro fertilization [!VF]) control access to it. At
the same time, since consumers have been cultivated to
desire the service (through what Lisa Sowle Cahill has
called the "rhetoric of desperation"), they do not perceive the monopoly as dominating or exploitative, even
though they (I ) are increasing the scope of medical
dominance; (2) may bear great burdens and costs in the
process (especially women}; and (3) may end up with no
outcome (for example, there is only a 20 percent success
rate with !VF), while the professionals are guaranteed
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benefits, such as income, professional status, or social
power. When power becomes accumulated in an insri ..
tution or professional group in such a way that the group
can define another's interests, influence individuals to
act contrary to their own interests, or influence those
individuals to act in ways that simply further the power
of the professional group, power becomes domination.
(For further discussion of the new reproductive technol ..
ogies from the perspective of social theories of the body,
see Corea et al., 1987.)
Application: Social theories of the body
and bioethics
With regard to bioethics, social theories of the body will
prove more critical than constructive. In the above dis.cussion of !VF, we have already begun to show how
bioethics looks different when approached from a socialtheories perspective. Rather than asking the standard
questions of bioethics (Is the patient competent? Who
decides? Did the patient give an informed consent? Do
the benefits outweigh the costs?), it will ask questions
of power (Who benefits most from a particular practice
or discourse? Is this a practice of surveillance, and if so,
for what end? Who has power in this particular situa#
tion?). It will describe how power functions within medical institutions; for instance, power rests mainly with
physicians or hospital administrators rather than nurses
who provide the hands-on, bodily care (see feminist
bioethics, especially Sherwin, 1992; Holmes and Purdy,
1992). It will analyze the dynamics of "choice," suggesting what social factors constrain choices (e.g., in the
case of !VF described above}, and how individual
choices are circumscribed so as to further the interests
of institutions and professional groups (Corea et al.,
1987). It will illuminate how bioethics, with medicine,
functions as an agent of social regulation (e.g., bioeth..
ics' emphasis on crafting national policies).
For social theories of the body, medicine has
emerged as one of the principal agents of social regula.tion, the crucial actor in contemporary biopower. Jn his
work The Birth of the Clinic (1973), Michel Foucault examines the relationships between medical technologies,
practices of surveillance, specialization of knowledge,
and consolidation of professional power (see also Turner,
1987). Increasingly, medicine offers treatments for aspects of embodied human life-fertiliry, height, baldness, death (e.g., euthanasta}-thereby defining an
expanding number of human conditions as pathological
and amenable to treatment and expanding its own influ#
ence. Even when treatments are not available 1 through
seemingly benign techniques of surveillance (especially,
for example, genetic testing), medicine seeks to bring
all individuals, and increasingly all parts of individuals'
lives, into its purview in order to "normalize" individuals
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and populations. The Human Genome Project, the mas.sive research initiative founded by the National lnsti ..
tutes of Health to map ''the" human genome, which will
be employed as a standard of normality, is just one ex.ample. In addition, medicine serves to marginalize and
control those who are not considered normal. Through
the judgment and practice of medicine, the sick and disabled are removed from the center of public space to the
margins-to the home, to the hospital, to the nursing..
care facility. Moreover, a movement (advocating eu ..
thanasia, assisted suicide, and/or advanced directives)
encourages that those "disordered,, bodies (bodies that
do not fit with the order of the culture) be moved beyond the boundaries of the human community, beyond
the boundary of life and death.
It can be likewise argued that this function of medicine as an agent of social regulation is bolstered by
bioethics. Generally, bioethics seeks to create arguments
and algorithms that justify, rather than challenge or critique, medical "advances." The discourse of bioethics
often provides an additional lens by which individuals
or groups are rendered more or less "normal," often
offering medicine and society moral justifications for
practices that further marginalize those deemed nonnor,
mative. Bioethicists increasingly seek to create a profes,
sional space for themselves, an area of expertise, from
which they can exercise benign dominance in the moral
evaluation of medical and biomedical practices; this role
is increasingly attested to by the frequency of "bioethi,
cists" in news sound bites.
Bioethics from the perspective of a social theory of
the body, however, challenges this trend. How might
social theories of the body illuminate the analysis of a
typical bioethical issue? Joanne Finkelstein offers a co,
gent example in her analysis of genetics. She notes how
genetic science promises to improve the lives of individ,
uals and populations by monitoring and altering human
bodies at the subcellular level through high technology
medicine. However, these technologies-for all their
apparent neutrality--carry with them significant nor,
rnative power, that is, "the power of determining which
human lives are more valuable, or in utilitarian terms,
which individuals are potential welfare burdens to the
community in the long term" (Finkelstein, 1990, p. 13).
Genetic screening is a technique of surveillance, the
penultimate extension of Foucault's "medical gaze."
Through a combination of screening, intervention to
abort defective fetuses, and interventions to alter hu,
man characteristics, genetic technologies undergird cul,
tural efforts to define and institutionalize "normalcy."
Genetic science has been granted the ability to define
which human characteristics are to be defined as path,
ological or unacceptable, which are open to genetic re,
mediation, and "which populations will become the

experimental subjects used in the future development of
the field" (Finkelstein, 1990, p. 14).
One might comment at this point that it seems that
even in this approach, one does not hear much about
"the body." This illustrates how difficult it is to keep the
focus on the body. However, what distinguishes social
theories of the body from other approaches is that they
consistently begin with bodies-with techniques that
are practiced on bodies (e.g., genetic screening), with
definitions of bodies or different types of embodiment
(e.g., definition of death), with the ways in which the
bodies of different groups are treated (e.g., access to
health care for the underserved), with the ways in which
"political" structures position, appeal to, or ignore the
bodies within them (e.g., issues of women's health). For
this approach, the point of intersection between insti,
tutions, practices, discourses, and human bodies serves
as the window through which to analyze political and
social structures, relationships of power and dominance,
and their moral and ethical effects.
While generally critical and analytical, social theories of the body may also serve a constructive function
in the practice of bioethics. For example, analysts may
use social theories of the body to identify ideological,
oppressive, or coercive power relationships within the
practice of medicine; they may then offer alternative
"politics" that better embody a preferred set of values.
By doing so, they illustrate how bodies, in conjunction
with alternative practices, discourses, and institutions,
also serve as the context for resistance to domination.
Bodies, as the locus for power, are equally the site for
control and the site for freedom. However, by illustrating the complexity of embodied social orders, these theories also indicate how difficult resistance can be and
how resistance requires community. Those who resist
ofren find themselves de facto members of a subculture.
Feminist approaches to bioethics are particularly illustra~
rive in this regard (Corea et al., 1987; Sherwin, 1992;
Holmes and Purdy, 1992).
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Directly related to this article are the other articles in this
entry: EMBODIMENT: THE PHENOMENOLOGICAL TRADI,
TION and CULTURAL AND RELIGIOUS PERSPECTIVES.
Also directly related is the entry HEALTH AND DISEASE,
articles on HISTORY OF THE CONCEPTS, and THE EXPERI,
ENCE OF HEALTH AND ILLNESS. For a further discussion of
topics mentioned in this article, see the entries AUTHORITY;
1

BEHAVIOR CONTROL; FEMINISM; FREEDOM AND CoER,
CIONj GENETICS AND HUMAN SELF,UNOERSTANDING;
LIFE; NARRATIVE; and NATURAL LAw. For a discussion
of related ideas, see the entries DEATH; and EuGENics,
article on ETHICAL ISSUES. Other relevant material may be
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III. CULTURAL AND RELIGIOUS
PERSPECTIVES
Scholarly and popular thought alike have typically assumed that the human body is a fixed, material entity
subject to the empirical rules of biological science. Such
a body exists prior to the mutability and flux of cultural
change and diversity, and is characterized by unchange#
able inner necessities. Beginning with the historical
work of Michel Foucault and Norbert Elias, the anthropology of Pierre Bourdieu, and phenomenological philosophers such as Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Hans Jonas,
Max Scheler, and Gabriel Marcel, however, scholarship
in the social sciences and humanities has begun to chal#
lenge this notion. Late twentieth-century commentators
argue that the body can no longer be considered as a fact
of nature, but is instead "an entirely problematic notion"
(Vernant, 1989, p. 20); that "the body has a history"
insofar as it behaves in new ways at particular historical
moments (Bynum, 1989, p. 171); that the body should
be understood not as a constant amidst flux but as an
epitome of that flux (Frank, 1991); and that "the universalized natural body is the gold standard of hegemonic social discourse" (Haraway, 1990, p. 146).
This scholarly perspective-that the body has a
history, and is not only a biological entity but also a
cultural phenomenon-goes hand in hand with the increasing number and complexity of bioethical issues in
contemporary society, many of which have strong religious overtones. Some decades ago the only such issue
arose in cases where religious and biomedical priorities
conflicted in the treatment of illness. Within the maJor~
ity population, various groups such as Christian Scien~
tists, some Pentecostal Christians, and members of small
fundamentalist sects occasionally have created contro#
versy by refusing medical treatment on the grounds that
faith in medicine undermined faith in God, in other
words, that since healing should occur only at the will
and discretion of the deity, human medicine was pre#
sumptuous upon divine prerogative. This was especially

